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Impacts of Aid for Trade on Trade with the EU
The Role of Old and New Member States
Beáta Udvari
Abstract Aid for Trade (AfT) is a new international program supporting developing 
countries to adjust to the multilateral trading system and to benefit from the liberalization 
process, by granting them more focused development assistance. The European Union is the 
largest aid provider in the world, and the EU has also incorporated the principles of AfT in its 
development policy. Previous research has proved that AfT is able to expand trade between 
developing countries and the EU itself. However, it is not yet clear whether this trade expansion 
is only the result of the EU-15’s activity or the new EU member states also contribute to it. 
Present research aims to investigate the impacts of the AfT assistance provided by the EU-15 
on the trade between the EU-15 and the recipient countries, and on the trade between the new 
EU-members and the recipients, respectively. The results of the gravity model indicate that the 
EU-15 is a more attractive market to ACP countries than the new member states: AfT provided 
to ACP countries positively influences the exports to EU-15, while it has no significant impact 
on trade with the new member states.
Keywords Aid for Trade - EU’s development policy - EU-15 - new member states - gravity 
model
JEL Classification F13 - F15 - F35
1. Introduction
Since 2005, Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative has been playing a significant role in international 
development cooperation. Its objective is to promote the exports of developing countries by 
improving supply-side capacity. Since its launch, a relatively wide literature has analysed its 
impacts on trade costs and export expansion. However, most of these analyses investigate 
the potential impacts in general without reflecting on donor-specific or recipient-specific 
aspects. For instance, the EU’s activity has not been investigated very deeply, despite the 
EU being the largest aid provider in the world. Moreover, the EU has built up a special 
relationship with developing countries, and the closest relationship is realized with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. As a result, ACP countries are the main 
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beneficiaries of the EU’s development policy and have been enjoying several – trade and 
economic – preferences and financial assistance granted by the European Union for decades. 
Although ACP countries’ share of the EU’s trade with third countries has decreased, the EU 
is still their most significant trade partner. Consequently, the EU can be a good example of 
how AfT may work in practice.
Some articles (see, for instance, Udvari 2011, 2013) analyse the potential impacts of AfT on 
total trade (total amount of imports and exports) between developing countries and the EU. 
These analyses investigate the total trade (aggregation of exports and imports) between some 
developing countries and the EU-27, with the EU-15 considered as a donor. Therefore, these 
results do not answer the question whether the assistance provided by the EU-15 contributes 
to the growing exports of developing countries only to the EU-15 or to the new member 
states, as well. Thus, the research objective of present paper is to analyse empirically how 
Aid for Trade can contribute to the export expansion of ACP countries to the EU-15, and 
to the new member states (NMS). In order to obtain the most comprehensive results of the 
gravity model, the empirical analysis includes developing countries out of the ACP-block, 
too.
The structure of present article is as follows. Section 2 gives an insight into the role of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in the EU’s international development cooperation. This is followed 
by Section 3 emphasizing the features of EU-ACP relations after the Millennium, focusing on 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements as the basis for 
trade relations between the ACP group and the EU. Section 4 details the most recent research 
results on Aid for Trade. Section 5 covers the methodological issues of the empirical analysis 
as well as presents the results.
2. Central and Eastern Europe in the EU’s development cooperation
Although the European Community became a member of the donor community in the 1970s, 
it was not until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that a legal framework to its development 
policy was provided (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2005). Therefore, 
countries accessing to the EU after the mid-90s had to accept these rules. However, countries 
joining the EU after the Millennium had another challenge: earlier they were recipients 
in international development cooperation, but with their EU-accession they were obliged 
to become donor countries (Migliorisi et al 2003, Lightfoot 2008). It was prescribed that 
the candidate countries should create an international development policy meeting the 
principles of the UN, the EU and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (Jakab 
2005). Since development cooperation was not subject to accession negotiations (Granell 
2005), accessing countries had to accept all articles of the common regulations without 
derogation (Dauderstaedt 2002, Morgera and Durán 2004, Lightfoot 2008), including the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the whole ACP relationship, the European consensus on 
development policy, the obligations of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), the 
principles of increasing resources accepted at the Monterrey conference and strengthened by 
the European Council, the Mediterranean partnership, the Everything But Arms initiative, 
and many other related regulations.
Adjusting to these conditions is not a simple task. Due to former political influence (in-
cluding both political and military interests) and to a less independent development policy, 
these countries had to face many challenges during the creation of a development coopera-
tion policy. The main challenge was that the aim of the EU’s development policy – namely 
to decrease poverty – was included only in some countries’ development policy, similarly, 
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the guidelines concerning the support of least-developed and African countries were also ne-
glected in the development policy of some countries (Migliorisi et al. 2003, Lightfoot 2010, 
Lightfoot–Szent-Iványi 2014).
As for aid commitments, NMS are also contributors to the budget of the EDF, which pro-
vides assistance mainly to ACP countries, though NMS do not provide so many contributions 
as would increase the EDF-resources significantly (Lightfoot 2008). Only 0.4 percent of the 
total assistance provided by the EU to developing countries comes from NMS (Granell 2005). 
According to OECD data, aid from Central and Eastern European countries fluctuates between 
0.08 and 0.13 percent of the countries’ GNI (OECD 2012), but the aim is to reach 0.36 percent 
by 2015. These data refer to the fact that though the NMS started their activity as donors, it is 
not so significant for them to contribute to the community’s and the EU-15’s aid activity – at 
least in terms of the financial resources. All these show that the development policy of the EU 
is driven by the EU-15.
It is important to analyse the new member states’ regional focus, too. The NMS were not 
colonising powers, thus, due to the lack of relations they provide assistance mainly to their 
neighbouring countries (former Yugoslav states, members of the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States, or the Balkans) (Table 1). Consequently, other (e.g. African) developing countries 
are not favoured (Dauderstaedt 2002, Migliorisi et al. 2003, Morgera and Durán 2004, Granell 
2005, Lightfoot 2008, Szent-Iványi 2009), though these areas officially form a part of the main 
priorities of the EU’s development cooperation. The aim of the NMS is not to decrease poverty 
or handle the challenges of fragile states, but to preserve stability in neighbouring regions and 
to prevent conflicts from arising (Lightfoot 2008, Szent-Iványi 2009). To sum up, aid alloca-
tions of the NMS are not determined by the GDP per capita, by economic growth or by the 
quality of institutions (Szent-Iványi 2009). All these seem to highlight the fact that aid granted 
for the ACP countries depends only on EU-15 and not on NMS.
Table 1 Aid allocation of the new member states
Cy
pr
us
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Es
to
ni
a
Po
la
nd
Li
th
ua
ni
a
H
un
ga
ry
M
al
ta
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus 2 1 1 1 1 1
the Balkans 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Central-Asia 2 2 2 1
Middle-East 1 3
Africa 3 1 3
South-East Asia 3 3 3 3
Latin-America 3 3 3
Note: 1: strong relationship, 2: medium intensity, 3: weak relationship. There is no data for Latvia.
Source: own construction based on Mogliorisi et al (2003), p. 21.
Although all official documents in the EU emphasize the special role of ACP countries, 
NMS are not obliged to provide development aid to these countries (Lightfoot 2010). As a 
result of weaker African and Caribbean relations and of the stronger neighbouring activities, 
the EU has paid greater attention to neighbourhood policy and to the support of candidate 
 Beáta Udvari80 
countries (Lightfoot 2008). This can be accepted as a success of NMS, but the EU’s focus has 
turned to other regions than the ACP countries.
Consequently, the following may be concluded in connection with the ACP countries: 
disposable financial resources have been extended, but not significantly. Furthermore, new 
member states have contributed to the changes of regional focus of the EU’s development 
cooperation: neighbouring countries have become competitors to the ACP countries. 
Nevertheless, ACP countries are still in the foreground: most EU-documents emphasize 
their priority. Considering these, it is supposed that the EU-15 is more responsible for 
expanding trade with developing countries due to Aid for Trade than the new EU-members 
are.
3. EU-ACP relations since the Millennium
Meanwhile, the EU has built up economic relations with developing countries with changing 
intensity. The strongest relations are with the ACP countries. The EU-ACP relations have a 
long history: institutional cooperation started in 1975 with the first Lomé Convention, later 
followed by three other. These conventions provided ACP countries free access to European 
markets till 2000. Although they aimed to expand trade between partners, the ACP countries’ 
share of the EU’s external trade dramatically decreased, and, on the contrary, the EU became 
the most important trading partner of the ACP countries.1 The Lomé Conventions formed a part 
of the EU’s development policy, but the EU took other factors but poverty into consideration 
while allocating aid resources to ACP countries (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 
2005). The main reason for a closer relationship was to obtain natural resources and to increase 
the EU’s international power as a regional integration. In the 1990s, other developing countries 
and the international community – mainly the USA – forced the EU to eliminate the non-
reciprocal trade preferences of the Lomé Conventions to meet the obligations of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). To comply with these challenges, the partner countries signed the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000.
3.1 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement
The main focus and objective of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is to promote economic, 
social and cultural development in ACP countries along with eradicating poverty (complying 
with the Millennium Development Goals) (Borrmann and Busse 2007, Nurse et al. 2008, 
EC 2010). This agreement is a milestone in the EU’s development policy and has brought 
several changes in the international development cooperation regarding ACP states (EC 2010, 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2005, Karingi et al. 2005, Szent-Iványi 2008):
- in the context of the new relationship, partnership became an important factor (as the 
official name of the agreement shows);
- political conditionality is introduced: countries hurting human rights will be excluded from 
the cooperation;
- broader political dialogue is ensured between the partner countries, concerning the fields of 
development cooperation, migration, arms trade and security;
1 This paper does not analyse the Lomé Conventions. See, for example, Babarinde (1994) or Curran et al. (2008).
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- involvement of non-governmental actors into the development processes is in focus;
- the overall objective is to decrease poverty, provide sustainable development and integrate 
developing countries into world trade;
- countries in most need are eligible for financial assistance, and the EU prefers good 
performers; and
- the two pillars of the EU’s development cooperation continued to be trade and aid.
As a result, Cotonou Agreement requires providing aid for the most eligible countries and 
for those which can use these financial resources in the most efficient way. However, there 
is a risk that countries which are not in the direct interest of the EU will not obtain Commu-
nity assistance. Altogether, laying down conditions and aiming at reducing poverty, the new 
agreement complies with the challenges of international development policy, however, there 
are fears that partner countries may suffer some losses. Ensuring a transition period, Lomé 
Conventions were in effect till the end of 2007, and during this period countries should have 
agreed on new types of partnership, called Economic Partnership Agreements, but they failed 
to do so (EC 2014).
3.2 Economic Partnership Agreements
From 2002 onwards, several negotiations started between the ACP and EU partners. The 
main aim is to negotiate with different ACP regions2 in order to sign agreements which 
really contribute to their economic development and to foster their share in world trade 
(Vollmer et al. 2009, Ukpe 2010). Consequently, EPAs are not traditional trade agreements, 
but agreements that aim at real development through trade policy and by promoting regional 
integration of ACP countries3 (Szent-Iványi 2008, Vollmer et al. 2009). Its concept includes 
reciprocal trade preferences and free trade, though it may at the same time contain a large 
risk for ACP countries, as they have to ensure access for European companies to their own 
market – though only to a smaller extent (averagely 80 percent in 15 years) (Vollmer et al. 
2009, EC 2014).
Negotiations are going forward, but several problems have occurred. As a result, though 
EPA negotiations should have been finished by the end of 2007, only Caribbean countries were 
able to conclude them (Nurse et al. 2008, Vollmer et al. 2009), while other regions signed only 
transition (interim) agreements aiming at gradual liberalization of merchandise up to 80-95 
percent in the next 15-20 years, but the EU ensures ACP countries free access to European 
markets (Table 2) (Szent-Iványi 2008).
2 The regions are West-African Economic and Monetary Union, Central-African Economic and Monetary Union, East 
African Community, South African Development Community, Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean, Pacific States, 
group of Pacific States (Ukpe 2010).
3 In Africa the overlapping integration process hinders deep integration (Shams 2005).
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Table 2 Rate of market opening and deadline in the ACP regions
Region Type of agreement Rate of market  
opening (%)
Deadline  
(within years)
Caribbean final 61
82.7
10
15
East African Community interim
EBA
64
80
82
2
15
25
Eastern and Southern 
Africa
interim
EBA
differs among members 
from 80 to 97
Southern Africa interim
EBA (Angola)
86 2
Pacific: Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji
interim
EBA
88 (PNG)
80 (Fiji)
15
15
Central Africa bilateral (Cameroon)
EBA
80 15
West Africa bilateral (Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire)
EBA
70 (CI)
80 (Ghana)
15
Note: EBA stands for Everything But Arms initiative
Source: author’s own construction based on Vollmer et al. (2009)
Several reasons may be listed why the Economic Partnership Agreements could not be 
concluded in time. Szent-Iványi (2008) and Ukpe (2010) argue that the largest problem is the 
lack of confidence and growing scepticism towards the European Union: ACP countries do 
not trust the EU any more. But the main economic risks of EPAs for ACP countries are the 
following (Szent-Iványi 2008, Boysen and Matthews 2009, Vollmer et al 2009, Ukpe 2010):
- economic structure of ACP countries cannot adjust to the new circumstances on time 
because of the problematic supply side capacity;
- decreasing income from tariffs leads to the postponement of development projects;
- regional integrations have trade creating and trade diversion effects, consequently, countries 
may not gain the same results from a regional integration;
- the new competition that arises with the appearance of European products may deteriorate 
companies in ACP countries;
- interim agreements concluded so far may hinder the regional integration process between 
African countries;
- the significant agriculture subsidy in European agriculture may cause losses in the 
agricultural exporting countries (and they face unequal competition);
- referring to sanitary regulations, the EU may not let in ACP agricultural export;
- the six regions export mainly natural resources: diamond, mineral oil and palm oil, which 
account for more than 40 percent of the regions’ exports;
- there are regulations which unambiguously serve the interests of the Community (for 
instance, the protection of intellectual property, trade in services, or investment).
There are many studies investigating the potential effects of EPAs on welfare and trade 
promotion, though their results are mixed because of the trade creation and trade diversion 
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effects (ODI 2006). Karingi et al. (2005) analysed the welfare impacts of EPAs on African 
countries. They found that the EU would gain the most on this business, and the expanded 
trade is the consequence of trade creation and trade diversion from the rest of the world, as 
well. Furthermore, African countries are likely to face a decrease in government revenues 
owing to tariff reduction (or elimination). This requires higher adjustment costs (tax reforms, 
administration changes) that African countries need to pay, on the one hand, and which 
jeopardizes African development, on the other hand.
Vollmer et al. (2009) – similarly to Karingi et al. (2005) – analysed the welfare effects 
of interim agreements on nine Sub-Saharan African countries. They claim that four of the 
nine countries enjoy positive effects of tariff reduction, while the remaining countries do 
not experience positive welfare changes. However, the authors argue that some loss of tariff 
reduction as a result does not mean that EPAs have negative impacts on African countries 
because they can gain more in this framework than under the simple GSP-scheme. Furthermore, 
lower tariffs result in lower government income (since the EU is the largest trade partner of 
the investigated countries) requiring lower market opening and longer transition period for 
African countries. The authors acknowledge that the European Union benefits the most from 
these agreements, but these extra profits should cover the EU’s further development actions.
Busse and Grossman (2007) analysed the fiscal and trade impacts of EPAs in West African 
countries. Their empirical results indicate that tariff reduction due to free trade agreements 
may cause troubles for African countries, therefore the authors suggest similar ideas than 
Vollmer et al. (2009): complementary reforms should be implemented before EPAs come into 
force. Furthermore, Borrmann and Busse (2007) emphasize that only countries with a high 
quality institutional system can benefit from the economic changes arising during the EPA-era. 
Based on these statements, the authors conclude that African countries may become the largest 
losers of these free trade agreements.
Fontagné et al. (2008) empirically tested some scenarios of the EPAs. According to their 
results, ACP countries’ loss will be large owing to tariff reduction, and the success depends 
on how the ACP-block can implement complementary reforms and how they can change their 
fiscal basis. Boysen and Matthews (2009) investigated the impacts of different EPA-scenarios 
on poverty in Uganda. Their results indicate that the extent of loss depends on the sensitivity 
of products involved into the negotiations, though the poorest people will lose the most after 
implementing the EPA.
Drawing on these (real) fears and risks, developing countries required additional financial 
resources for concluding and implementing such an agreement and for adjusting to the new 
circumstances. As a result, ACP countries asked the EU to use Aid for Trade to help them meet 
these requirements (Hinkle et al. 2005, Meyn 2008).
4. Potential impacts of Aid for Trade
Since many countries were unable to follow the liberalization process and to adjust to the new 
international trade environment, the WTO launched the Aid for Trade initiative in 2005. AfT 
may be essential for developing countries, since they would be the main losers if Doha Round 
fails (Abbott et al. 2009, Deardorff and Stern 2009). 
The programme aims to help developing countries expand their exports, participate in the 
multilateral trade system more effectively, and benefit from liberalisation. In order to fulfil 
these goals, six areas of financial assistance were determined (WTO 2006): trade policy and 
regulation; trade development; trade-related infrastructure; building productive capacity; 
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trade-related adjustment; and other trade-related needs. As a result, the primary objective of 
AfT is to improve the supply-side capacity (Hallaert and Munro 2009), which may lead to the 
development of the business environment. A high quality business environment is essential 
to reach the positive effects of participating in international trade (Freund and Bolaky 2008, 
Dreger and Herzer 2011). However, the program has also been criticized sharply: though AfT 
aims to support the least developed countries, there are empirical evidences showing that in 
practice aid allocation does not follow this expectation (Udvari 2011, Uhrin and Schuszter 
2013). For instance, the European Union has implemented more AfT projects in China (as one 
of the largest exporters in the world) than in Sub-Saharan Africa (Udvari 2013).
Although AfT belongs to the financial assistance group, its economic impacts seem 
to be more spectacular and persuasive than the effects of general development assistance. 
According to the official documents, it is not expected that AfT would behave as a tied aid, 
that is, recipient countries do not have to follow the conditions of donor countries. However, 
relevant literature analysing the potential impacts of AfT assumes this statement. Studies 
discussing these impacts can be grouped as follows: studies which analyse the impacts of AfT 
on export volumes regardless of donors (Cali and te Velde 2011, Pettersson and Johansson 
2013); or studies which investigate the impacts of AfT provided by a donor on trade between 
the recipient and the donor (Bearce et al., 2013; Udvari, 2013; Uhrin and Schuszter, 2013). 
Furthermore, only few studies have dealt with the European Union’s AfT-activity. Udvari 
(2013) showed with a gravity model that AfT provided by the EU might cause trade expansion 
between donors and recipients, though in her analysis total trade (sum of exports and imports) 
was the dependent variable. Consequently, these results may be distorting as her model does 
not answer the question whether AfT contributes to export or import expansion in developing 
countries, that is, which party (the EU or the developing countries) gain more.   
Cali and te Velde (2011) analysed the export volume changes by involving 100 developing 
countries in the investigation. According to their econometric results, AfT assistance on the 
development of economic infrastructure results in growing exports. Pettersson and Johansson 
(2013) have similar results: assisting the development of trade infrastructure results in export 
growth, however, the authors do not give as large emphasis to AfT as Cali and te Velde (2011) 
did. Helble et al. (2009) found the assistance on trade policy as a significant factor: one percent 
growth in trade policy aid results in 818 million USD trade expansion worldwide. Bearce et 
al. (2013) narrowed their analysis to the aid activity of the USA. Their results indicate that one 
dollar growth in AfT results in 65 dollar trade expansion in the recipient country, but this impact 
may be higher in countries most in need (poorer, landlocked). Vijil and Wagner (2010) found 
that 10 percent growth in aid for improving trade infrastructure results in 1.22 percent growth of 
the recipient’s export. Furthermore, Vijil (2013) analysed how AfT may contribute to economic 
integration. According to her results, AfT has positive effects on both South-South and North-
South integrations. However, there is no answer to how AfT influences intra-trade within an 
integration. Udvari and Kis (2014) aimed to answer this question in their study: their empirical 
results proved that AfT provided to the member countries of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) does not have significant impact on expanding intra-regional trade. 
Besides general and overall approaches, there are studies investigating the effects from a 
donor’s perspective. These analyses may be more reliable since the good performing countries 
would not cover the less good performing countries’ achievements (or vice versa). Brayzs 
(2013) dealt with four donors (USA, Japan, Germany and Norway) in four recipient countries 
(Indonesia, Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam). The author stated that the AfT had different 
impacts depending on the donor and the recipient. This statement refers to the fact that aid 
activities (including AfT) need to be analysed in a donor-specific way.
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Some empirical analyses (Udvari 2013, Uhrin and Schuszter 2013) justify the claim  that 
though AfT has several good objectives, economic, political and strategic interests are more 
important for donor countries than real needs. For example, Iraq and Afghanistan are among 
the most supported countries. Or in the USA’s aid policy, the USA’s own interests are the most 
important factor. All these may hinder the effectiveness of AfT.
Huchot-Bourdon et al. (2009) analysed these processes in another way. They analysed the 
relationship between FDI, trade and development, and they created groups of developing 
countries reflecting the different needs developing countries have and determining the priorities 
of recipient countries to help donors in their aid allocation. Their results indicate that trade-
related needs, especially infrastructure development, are more highlighted in East and West 
Africa. Consequently, Aid for Trade may have significant effects in the region’s development 
process, including the integration process, too.
This literature review shows that the EU has strong economic and trade relations with 
developing countries, especially with ACP countries, and the EU is the largest aid provider in 
the world. The Cotonou Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements try to strengthen 
the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries, however, it is also concerned that 
additional financial resources are needed. So that developing countries are able to improve 
their trade capacities, Aid for Trade offers a good opportunity and ACP countries asked the 
EU to involve this program into the EPA negotiations. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse 
whether AfT provided by the EU contributes to the trade expansion of ACP countries and 
whether it is the result of growing trade with EU-15 or with the new member states.
5. Role of Aid for Trade in trade relations: ACP countries and the European Union
This section details the methodology and the results of the empirical analysis concerning the 
trade expansion impacts of Aid for Trade provided by the EU. First, the process of selecting 
recipient and donor countries and indicators is detailed, including the measurement questions 
of Aid for Trade. Then, the gravity model is discussed followed by the analysis of the results.
5.1 Countries and indicators
As a first step, potential recipient and donor countries were selected. The goal was to involve 
into the analysis as many developing (recipient) countries as possible. Out of the 123 developing 
countries in the world4, 82 countries were involved – out of them 41 countries belong to the 
ACP group. 33 countries are least developed countries5, and out of them 26 belong to the ACP 
block. The remaining developing countries were left out as there was no available data whether 
they received any AfT assistance from the EU between 2006 and 2012.
As for the donor countries, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee was the starting 
point. All old EU member states (EU-15) are members of this organization, and since 2013, three 
new member states (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic) have become members, too. 
Since the analysis covers the aid activity in the period between 2006 and 2012, the donor activity 
of the EU-15 was considered as the entire EU’s donor activity. This cannot have a distorting 
4 There are 144 low and middle income countries (generally developing countries), but some of them are the so called 
transition economies (see UN 2011). These countries were left out.
5 Least developed countries were determined according to the list of the United Nations (UN OHRLLS 2014).
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effect, as the EU-15 has experience in development policy and has built up a widespread aid 
activity, while NMS have less relationship with developing countries.6 Furthermore, Article 210 
of the Lisbon Treaty also supports this approach, as it says that in order to establish a more 
effective development policy, member states and the community work together and harmonize 
their development activity in the scene of international organizations. As a result, the EU’s donor 
activity is in fact the sum of the EU-15’s activity and the aid data of EU Institutions.
In calculating current Aid for Trade trends, recommendations of Turner (2008) and OECD-
CRS (2011) were followed. According to them, AfT amounts are equal to the sum of assistance 
on several sub-sectors on which the OECD collects data. Both commitments and disbursements 
were available to analyse, but disbursed aid was used as basis for calculation, as this amount 
covers already paid amounts. In this analysis, the following sectors appeared as the sum of AfT:
- Trade related infrastructure appears in the OECD database as economic infrastructure 
containing the subsectors of transport and storage; communications; and energy supply.
- The categories of building productive capacity and trade development appear in the OECD 
database as building productive capacity and consist of three subcategories: bank and 
financial services; business and other services; agriculture and industry.
- The category of trade policy and regulations is the same in the OECD database.7
A cross-sectional analysis was prepared because of the short (official) existence of Aid for 
Trade. Data were collected for the years between 2006 and 2013 (the official existence of Aid 
for Trade), but in order to handle the endogeneity problem (which will be discussed later), there 
was a one-year-lag in the case of independent variables. The trade and GDP data originated 
from the on-line database of UNCTAD Stat (UNCTAD 2014), the aid data from OECD-CRS 
(2014) and the distance data from CEPII (2011).
5.2 Methodology
The aim of the investigation is to analyse whether Aid for Trade significantly influences trade 
between the selected developing countries and the European Union as a whole, and between 
the developing countries and the EU-15 and NMS. For this purpose, a gravity model was 
calculated. Gravity models are appropriate methods to investigate a benchmark of trade flows 
(Carey et al. 2007), and assume that trade is positively affected by the income of the partner 
countries and negatively affected by their distance as the proxy of transport costs (Africano 
and Magelhães 2005). The specification in present paper was based on the work of Wagner 
(2003) and Africano and Magelhães (2005) with slight modifications:
lnEXPi,eu = β0 + β1 ln(Yi*Yeu) + β2 ln (Yci*Yceu) + β3 lnDisti,eu + β4 lnAft + β5 Time + 
+ β6 ACP + β7 Oil + β8 LDC + e
 (1)
- EXPi,eu denotes export from i developing country to the EU;
- Yi,Yeu are the total GDP in country i and in the EU. Their product refers to the market size;
- Yci,Yeu denote the GDP per capita in country i and in the EU, and their product indicates the 
income level;
6 List of both the recipient and donor countries can be found in the Appendix.
7 Helble et al. (2009), Cali and te Velde (2011), Hoekman and Wilson (2010), and Vijil and Wagner (2010) have 
similar approach in their empirical investigation.
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- Disti,eu means the distance between country i and the European Union;
- Time variable denotes the years (2006-2012) involved as dummy variables (where 1 
indicates the certain year, otherwise 0);
- ACP, Oil, LDC are dummy variables for ACP-countries, oil exporting-countries and least 
developed countries, where zero means non-ACP countries and oil exporting countries, and 
1 means the contrary. The same is true for the LDC dummy.
In order to analyse what kind of direct effects the Aid for Trade has in the different country 
groups (ACP, LDC, oil-exporting), equation (2) contains the following interactions: 
the coefficient of lnAfT*ACP shows how much impact the Aid for Trade has on the trade 
expansion if the recipient country belongs to the ACP group. The other interactions (AfT*LDC 
and AfT*Oil) can be solved similarly.
lnEXPi,eu = β0 + β1 ln(Yi*Yeu) + β2 ln (Yci*Yceu) + β3 lnDisti,eu + β4 lnAft * ACP +  
+ β5 lnAft * LDC + β6 InAfT*Oil + β7 Time + β8 InAfT + e
 (2)
Although gravity models may contain other indicators, too, such as common language or 
colonial past (see for example the studies of Africano and Magelhães (2005), Carey et al. 
(2007) or Wagner (2003)), they were found not important since the EU as a whole can be 
imagined as a great economic power with several colonies. Almost all countries in the sample 
share a colonial past with some EU-member states; therefore investigating this aspect would 
not denote additional information in this approach. Similarly, common language is not relevant 
in this context in this model. Regarding distance as an independent variable, Germany was 
chosen as a reference country to determine the distance between country i and the EU. As in 
present analysis the EU is considered as an integrated whole, a fix point was needed to which 
the distance of sample countries could be related. The mean of the nearest and furthest points 
could have been another potential point of reference, but it resulted in different ‘capital’ for the 
EU, therefore this solution was rejected.
It was a great challenge how to handle the case if AfT was zero in a certain country in 
some of the investigated – but not in all – years. Wagner (2003) and Cali and te Velde (2011) 
mention a solution: if the aid is zero, one can calculate as (1+aid), but they add that it may 
have distorting effects. To handle this situation, Wagner (2003) – who Cali and te Velde (2010) 
follow – recommends dummy variables (1 if aid is zero, and 0 if aid is above zero), which 
methodological device was partly accepted during this analysis. Consequently, calculating 
the logarithm of aid, the following specification was used as Wagner (2003) recommends: 
ln(max(1, aid). But the dummy variables contained no more information, so they were left out. 
As a result, this calculation was able to keep aid level zero where it was that originally.
Aid-related regression models always raise the question of endogeneity, meaning that 
dependent variables highly correlate with the error term. In the present case it means that it 
is not sure whether aid results in increasing trade or better trade performance has an impact 
on aid allocation. Since it has a distorting effect, it is needed to be solved. A solution is to 
involve instrumental or proxy variables in the analysis (for instance, Angeles and Neanidis 
2009, or Grange et al. 2009), though these instruments may describe the original variable 
incorrectly, this way causing further distortion (Younas 2008). In aid studies the most common 
tool for handling the endogeneity problem is to calculate with lagged independent variables 
(Younas 2008, Kimura et al. 2012). However, there is no consensus in this question. Cali 
and te Velde (2011) calculated with lagged aid data in their regression model, while Wagner 
(2003) analysed the aid effect on trade both lagged and not lagged. He concludes that current 
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(and not previous) year’s development assistance contributes to the trade performance in the 
current year. According to these, in present analysis all independent variables are lagged by 
one year. Its economic sense is that earlier economic performance determines present trade 
performance, and AfT received in the previous year leads to trade expansion which appears in 
the following year’s performance.
These calculations were prepared for the EU (itself), the EU-15 countries and the 
NMS. The models were tested whether they met the requirements of regression models 
(heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation). When a problem occurred it was solved 
by suitable methods (for instance, the Cochrane Orcutt method for handling autocorrelation). 
The following chapters contain the final results.
5.3 The EU
Before detailing the old and new member states’ trade with particular developing countries, 
the EU’s performance need to be presented (Table 3). Model 1 includes the Aid for Trade as a 
variable and other dummy variables as well. AfT provided by the EU has no significant impact 
on the exports of developing countries to the EU. Instead, market size (paired GDP) determines 
the export: the larger the market is, the larger the export is. Furthermore, if the country belongs 
to the ACP group, export to the EU is higher, while in the case of least developed countries this 
process goes to the opposite direction. Consequently, ACP countries export more to the EU, 
while trade with least developed countries is decreasing.
Table 3 Coefficients (and p-values) – Partner: EU-27
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant -13.694 (0.000) -14.266 (0.000)
Paired GDP (ln) 1.121. (0.000) 1.113 (0.000)
Paired GDP per capita (ln) -0.021 (0.771) 0.013 (0.853)
Distance (ln) -0.213 (0.039) -0.181 (0.082)
2007 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.176 (0.269) -0.194 (0.230)
2008 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.612 (0.000) -0.631 (0.000)
2009 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.325 (0.043) -0.336 (0.039)
2010 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.224 (0.166) -0.236 (0.553)
2011 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.528 (0.002) -0.556 (0.001)
2012 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.517 (0.002) -0.538 (0.001)
Total Aid for Trade (ln) 0.000 (0.998) -0.026 (0.570)
ACP-countries (0: no. 1: yes) 0.724 (0.000)
Oil exporting countries (0: no. 1: yes) 0.179 (0.143)
Least developed countries (0: no. 1: yes) -0.662 (0.000)
AfT*ACP 0.169 (0.000)
AfT*LDC -0.141 (0.000)
AfT*Oil exporters 0.055 (0.076)
R2 0.831 0.825
Adj. R2 0.827 0.821
Observations 574 574
VIF max. 3.305 3.093
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.063 2.062
Source: own calculations
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Model 2 includes the AfT*ACP interaction indicating the direct impacts of AfT on ACP 
countries. This interaction has significant impact on the exports. If the country belongs to the 
ACP group, one percent growth in AfT assistance results in 1.18 percent growth in exports. 
On the contrary, increasing AfT in the least developed countries will result in decreasing 
exports. The reason for this may be that the infrastructure of allocating and using aid is more 
underdeveloped in these countries, therefore, aid may counteract export performance.
5.4 Old member states
The same procedure was followed in the case of the old EU-members to analyse whether Aid 
for Trade provided by the EU contributes to the expanding exports of developing countries 
to the EU-15. The results are shown in Table 4. There are no great differences between the 
two models. There are only some significant variables: the market size (paired GDP) and the 
constants, and some years (with negative impacts). However, the coefficients are similar to 
those in the case of the EU-27.
Table 4 Coefficients (and p-values) – Partner: EU-15
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant -14.106 (0.000) -14.719 (0.000)
Paired GDP (ln) 1.115 (0.000) 1.110 (0.000)
Paired GDP per capita (ln) -0.009 (0.899) 0.028 (0.688)
Distance (ln) -0.183 (0.075) -0.156 (0.131)
2007 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.182 (0.251) -0.202 (0.210)
2008 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.618 (0.000) -0.640 (0.000)
2009 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.332 (0.038) -0.345 (0.034)
2010 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.235 (0.144) -0.250 (0.125)
2011 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.555 (0.001) -0.587 (0.000)
2012 (0: no. 1: yes) -0.535 (0.001) -0.558 (0.001)
Total Aid for Trade (ln) 0.008 (0.854) -0.025 (0.596)
ACP-countries (0: no. 1: yes) 0.732 (0.000)
Oil exporting countries (0: no. 1: yes) 0.216 (0.076)
Least developed countries (0: no. 1: yes) -0.647 (0.000)
AfT*ACP 0.173 (0.000)
AfT*LDC -0.134 (0.000)
AfT*Oil exporters 0.064 (0.038)
R2 0.832 0.826
Adj. R2 0.828 0.822
Observations 574 574
VIF max. 3.153 3.093
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.115 2.113
Source: own calculations
Aid for Trade is not significant in any case. That is, the Aid for Trade assistance provided 
by the EU-15 does not contribute to the increasing exports of the recipients to the EU-15. ACP 
and least developed countries show the same tendency as it was in the case of the EU-27. This 
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is true for the second model, too, where AfT to ACP countries results in growing exports, while 
the contrary is true for the least developed countries. Furthermore, in the case of the EU-15, 
AfT provided to oil exporting countries results in an increasing export of these developing 
countries to the EU-15. To sum up, if ACP countries receive AfT, it results in a favourable 
export growth towards the EU market.
5.5 New member states
The next phase of the analysis was to investigate the effects of Aid for Trade on exports of 
developing countries to the new EU-members. Table 5 contains the results of the regression 
models. These results totally differ from the results of the EU and the EU-15: neither year is 
significant in this case, while the proxy indicator of income (paired GDP per capita) is significant 
(it has not been significant so far). Consequently, in the case of NMS, income level determines 
the exports of developing countries: the richer the country is, the lower volume of exports goes to 
the NMS. Moreover, not only the least developed countries’ but also the ACP countries’ variable 
is significant, both of them have negative coefficients, meaning that if a certain country belongs 
to these groups, the export volume to the NMS will be lower. The same is true about oil exporting 
countries indicating that the NMS still have strong connections to Russia.
Table 5 Coefficients and (p-values) – Partner: NMS
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant -14.944 (0.000) -20.446 (0.000)
Paired GDP (ln) 1.362 (0.000) 1.386 (0.000)
Paired GDP per capita (ln) -0.617 (0.000) -0.450 (0.001)
Distance (ln) -0.044 (0.819) 0.087 (0.658)
2007 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.402 (0.269) 0.311 (0.393)
2008 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.460 (0.193) 0.313 (0.374)
2009 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.153 (0.663) -0.176 (0.614)
2010 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.361 (0.306) 0.003 (0.992)
2011 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.206 (0.558) 0.196 (0.575)
2012 (0: no. 1: yes) 0.104 (0.768) -0.115 (0.742)
Total Aid for Trade (ln) 0.082 (0.317) 0.245 (0.007)
ACP-countries (0: no. 1: yes) -0.423 (0.037)
Oil exporting countries (0: no. 1: yes) -0.825 (0.000)
Least developed countries (0: no. 1: yes) -1.354 (0.000)
AfT*ACP -0.059 (0.266)
AfT*LDC -0.249 (0.000)
AfT*Oil exporters -0.165 (0.006)
R2 0.673 0.663
Adj. R2 0.665 0.655
Observations 574 574
VIF max. 3.305 3.093
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.044 2.032
Source: own calculations
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Regarding Model 2, there are further differences from the statements mentioned above. 
On the one hand, AfT provided to developing countries has a significant impact on exports, 
however, AfT provided directly to ACP countries does not. On the other hand, AfT to the least 
developed and oil exporting countries negatively influences the exports of these countries to 
the markets of the new member states. These results prove that new member states do not 
have important economic relations with developing countries, and it seems that the new EU 
members do not tend to create the possibilities for turning this progress back. 
6. Conclusions
The objective of present paper was to discuss whether Aid for Trade provided by the EU 
contributes to the export expansion of developing countries to the EU-15 or to the new EU-
members. Gravity models were used to analyse this question. 
The EU’s new member states do not pay remarkable attention to the relations with developing 
(including ACP) countries, and the empirical results indicate the same. Although AfT provided 
by the EU itself does not have significant impact on exports of recipient countries neither 
to EU nor to the EU-15 or to the new member states, AfT provided to ACP countries has 
positive effects in terms of exports to the EU-27 and the EU-15. However, the negative and 
insignificant results in the case of the NMS prove that the EU-15’s markets are more attractive 
to ACP countries. With reference to a study by Udvari (2013) in which the author proved 
empirically that AfT had a positive impact on total trade between the recipient developing 
countries and the new member states, now we can accept that this result was driven mainly 
by the growing exports of NMS to the recipient countries. Consequently, the EU-15 plays the 
most significant role not only in providing aid to developing countries, but also in ensuring 
markets for products exported by the ACP countries.
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